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ABSTRACT
As cloud-based storage becomes more popular, an increasing amount of data has been
outsourced to cloud storage. For many businesses, individuals, or even governments, data
privacy has become an important concern. The confidentiality of data can be protected by
encryption, but this alone may not suffice for ensuring data privacy. Data access patterns
can leak a considerable amount of information about the data as well. Even though existing
Oblivious RAM (ORAM) constructions are provable solutions to this issue, their performance
in practice has been impeded by the high communication and storage overheads incurred. In
this thesis, we implemented a Segmentation-based ORAM (S-ORAM) to reduce communication
and storage overhead. Experiments have shown that S-ORAM can effectively protect user’s
privacy as well as achieve low communication and storage overhead.
1CHAPTER 1. INTRODUCTION
Cloud storage, such as Dropbox [Dropbox (2007)] and Amazon S3 [Amazon (2006)], are
widely used nowadays. It is a model of networked enterprise storage that data is stored in
virtual pools of storage, which are generally hosted by third parties. Compared to traditional
private storage, cloud storage has two main advantages. First, the price is much cheaper. Users
(individuals, institutions, companies or government agencies) only need to pay for the storage
they actually use, typically an average of consumption during a month. Second, it is much
easier to maintain. Users now can write software or scripts to configure hundreds of storage
servers automatically instead of configuring them one by one.
More and more companies and even government agencies choose public cloud for storing
data. However, as cloud providers have complete control of users’ outsourced data, the security
and privacy problems arise and are becoming a big concern.
Encrypting data has been a common practice for data protection. But the sequence of
storage locations accessed by the client (i.e., access pattern) could still leak a significant amount
of sensitive information, if statistical inference is applied. For example, Islam et al. [Islam
et al. (2012)] demonstrated that an adversary can infer as much as 80% of the search queries
by observing accesses to an encrypted email repository.
To address this issue, the Oblivious RAM (ORAM) algorithm, first proposed by Goldreich
and Ostrovsky [Goldreich and Ostrovsky (1996)], has attracted a lot of attention. The algo-
rithm conceals a client’s access pattern to the remote storage by continuously shuﬄing and
re-encrypting data as they are accessed. Even though an adversary can observe the physical
storage locations that a client has accessed, the ORAM algorithm ensures that the adversary
has negligibly-small probability to learn anything about the client’s true access pattern.
Since its proposal, the research community has developed and implemented many ORAM
2schemes. Among them, hash-based ORAMs and index-based ORAMs are two main branches.
Hash-based ORAMs [Goldreich and Ostrovsky (1996); Goodrich and Mitzenmacher (2010);
Goodrich et al. (2012); Goodrich and Mitzenmacher (2011); Goodrich et al. (2011); Kushilevitz
et al. (2012); Pinkas and Reinman (2010); Williams and Sion (2008)] utilize hash functions
(including ordinary hash functions, cuckoo hash functions, bloom filters, etc.) to determine a
data block’s storage location when the block is stored or shuﬄed, and to look up intended data
blocks. In comparison, index-based ORAMs [Shi et al. (2011); Stefanov et al. (2013); Stefanov
and Shi (2013); Stefanov et al. (2011)] maintain index tables to keep the mapping from data
blocks to their storage locations and update them after each query.
ORAM can effectively protect user’s privacy in theory. However, most existing ORAM
constructions are not practical because of the high communication and/or storage overheads
that they may incur. Particularly, hash-based ORAMs require a large extra storage space at the
server side in order to deal with hash collisions. Also access pattern privacy usually has to be
preserved through frequent data retrievals and complicated data shuﬄing. Index-based ORAMs
are also impractical. Even though they rely on index tables to avoid the above problems in
hash-based ORAMs, it is hard to find a way to store the index table in a space-efficient way
and to search and update it in a time-efficient way. This limitation has also impeded their
applications in practice.
Recently, Zhang et. al. [Jingsheng Zhang (2014)] proposed a novel ORAM scheme, called
segmentation-based oblivious RAM (S-ORAM), aiming to bring theoretical ORAM construc-
tions more practical. The design was motivated by the observation that a large-scale storage
system usually stores data in blocks and such a block typically has a large size [Stefanov et al.
(2011)], but most existing ORAM constructions treat data blocks as atomic units for query
and shuﬄing, and do not factor block size into their designs. In order to make a better use of
the large block size, two segment-based techniques have been introduced, namely, piece-wise
shuﬄing and segment-based query, which can efficiently improve the efficiency in query and
data shuﬄing. Data can be perturbed across a larger range of blocks in a limited user-side
storage with piece-wise shuﬄing. In this way, the shuﬄing efficiency can be improved, and
the improvement gets more significant as the block size increases. With segment-based query,
3S-ORAM organizes the data storage at the server side as a hierarchy of single-segment and
multi-segment layers, and each layer are with an encrypted index block. With these two tech-
niques at the core, together with a few supplementary algorithms for distributing blocks to
segments, S-ORAM can accomplish efficient query with only O(log N) communication over-
head and a constant user-side storage, while existing ORAM constructions have to use a larger
user-side storage to achieve the same level of communication efficiency in query.
The Balanced ORAM (B-ORAM) [Kushilevitz et al. (2012)] and the Path ORAM (P-
ORAM) [Stefanov et al. (2013)] are the state-of-the-art hash and index based ORAMs respec-
tively, in terms of both practical and theoretical standards. In terms of communication and
storage overheads, S-ORAM outperforms both of them. When they have the same constant-size
user-side storage, S-ORAM’s communication overhead is 12 to 23 times less than B-ORAM,
60% to 72% less bandwidth than P-ORAM, particularly under practical settings. Meanwhile,
S-ORAM consumes 80% less server-side storage than P-ORAM.
This thesis work has implemented the S-ORAM design and delivered a prototype of dis-
tributed file system that aims to preserve access pattern for users of the file system. Experi-
ments based on the prototype have also been conducted. The results show that our implemented
system can fully protect user’s access pattern and more importantly, significantly reduce com-
munication and storage overhead compared to the other ORAM schemes. Particularly, the
difference between querying the same block and querying randomly picked block for many
times is negligible. The user-side storage remains at a small constant value and the average
communication overhead is small.
The rest of the thesis is organized as follows: Chapter 2 presents related works. Chapter 3
introduces problem statement. Chapter 4 describes design of S-ORAM. Chapter 5 details im-
plementation of S-ORAM. The evaluation results are reported in Chapter 6. Finally, Chapter 7
concludes this thesis.
4CHAPTER 2. RELATED WORK
2.1 Theoretical ORAM
Oblivious RAM was first proposed by Goldreich and Ostrovsky [Goldreich (1987); Goldreich
and Ostrovsky (1996); Ostrovsky (1990)] for the purpose of protecting software from piracy and
efficient simulation of programs on oblivious RAMs. Two solutions were elaborated. The first
solution, called Square-Root, has high complexity so only served as a preliminary step towards
the second solution, the Hierarchical solution. The Hierarchical solution makes any program
oblivious by replacing N stored items with O(NlogN) items and replacing a direct access to
an item in RAM with O(log3N) accesses to RAM.
The high-level description of Ostrovskys hierarchical solution can be stated as follows: there
is a sequence of buffers whose sizes grow at a geometric rate, and smaller buffers are reshuﬄed
into larger ones as they fill up. In the original work [Ostrovsky (1990)], the buffers were standard
hash-tables with sufficiently large buckets, and a technique known as oblivious shuﬄing was
employed for reshuﬄing. Then, a slightly different and somewhat simpler reshuﬄing method
was proposed [Goldreich and Ostrovsky (1996)].
The efficiency of Oblivious RAM is measured by three main parameters: the amount of local
(client) storage, the amount of remote (server) storage, and the (amortized) overhead of reading
or writing an element. [Goldreich (1987)] used sub-linear local storage, while [Ostrovsky (1990);
Goldreich and Ostrovsky (1996)] both used a constant amount of local storage. Ostrovskys
hierarchical solution used O(nlogn) remote storage, and offered two different ways to perform
oblivious shuﬄing that led to either O(log4n) access overhead with a small hidden constant, or
O(log3n) access overhead with a large hidden constant.
Subsequent works improved upon Ostrovskys hierarchical solution. They can be roughly
5classified into two categories based on the data lookup technique used: hash-based ORAMs
and index-based ORAMs.
2.2 Hash-based ORAMs
Hash-based ORAMs [Goldreich and Ostrovsky (1996); Goodrich and Mitzenmacher (2010);
Goodrich et al. (2012); Goodrich and Mitzenmacher (2011); Goodrich et al. (2011); Kushilevitz
et al. (2012); Pinkas and Reinman (2010); Williams and Sion (2008)] use hash functions for data
lookup, and facilities such as buckets and stashes are required to deal with hash collisions. To
the best of our knowledge, among these ORAMs, the Balanced ORAM (B-ORAM) [Kushilevitz
et al. (2012)] achieves the best asymptotical communication efficiency.
In B-ORAM, the server-side storage is organized as a hybrid hierarchy with a total of logNlog logN
layers, where each layer consists of logN equal-size sub-layers. For the top O(log logN) layers,
the bucket-hash structure [Goldreich and Ostrovsky (1996)] is deployed and the remaining
layers are cuckoo-hash structures with a shared stash [Goodrich and Mitzenmacher (2010)].
Since each layer is extended to multiple sub-layers, the shuﬄing frequency is reduced while the
query overhead is increased; a balance is struck between the query and shuﬄing overheads.
The randomized shell-sort [Goodrich (2010)] is selected as the underlying oblivious sorting
algorithm for the shuﬄing process. In theory, the amortized communication overhead of B-
ORAM is O
(
log2N
log logN
)
blocks per query. In practice, however, the overhead is on the magnitude
of log3N due to a large constant hidden in the above big-O notation; particularly, querying
one data block may require the user to access at least 1000 data blocks, which may not be
acceptable in many practical applications.
2.3 Index-based ORAMs
Index-based ORAMs [Shi et al. (2011); Stefanov et al. (2013); Stefanov and Shi (2013);
Stefanov et al. (2011)] use an index structure for data lookup. Therefore, they requires that
the user-side storage stores the index table, which is feasible only if the number of data blocks
is not quite large. Otherwise it will greatly increase user-side storage. When the user-side
6storage cannot afford to store the index, it can outsource the index table to the server in a
way similar to storing real data blocks at the cost of increased communication overhead. And
the index outsourcing can be done recursively. The Path ORAM (P-ORAM) [Stefanov et al.
(2013)] outperforms all other schemes in this category.
In P-ORAM, the server-side storage is organized as a binary tree in which each node contains
a constant-size bucket for storing data blocks. Initially, data blocks are randomly stored at
leaf nodes, and an index structure is maintained to record the mapping between the IDs of
data blocks and the IDs of the leaf nodes storing the blocks. Based on the index, a data query
process retrieves all blocks on the path that contains the query target block and then moves
the target block to the root node. In addition, a background eviction process is performed after
each query process, to gradually evict blocks from the root node to nodes of lower-height so as
to avoid or reduce node overflowing. The index can also be outsourced to the server and stored
in a similar binary tree. Besides, to keep bucket size constant at each node, a user-side storage
whose size is a logarithmic function of the number of data blocks is needed to form a stash.
P-ORAM achieves a communication overhead of O
(
log2N
log(Z/ logN)
)
·ω(1) blocks per query, where
Z is data block size and ω(1) is a security parameter. Though the communication overhead
is considered to be acceptable in practice [Stefanov et al. (2013)], the overhead of server-side
storage, which is about 32N blocks, may pose as a big cost to the user.
7CHAPTER 3. PROBLEM STATEMENT
3.1 System Model
We consider a system composed of a user and a remote storage server, which is similar to
existing ORAM constructions [Goldreich and Ostrovsky (1996); Goodrich and Mitzenmacher
(2010); Goodrich et al. (2012); Goodrich and Mitzenmacher (2011); Goodrich et al. (2011);
Kushilevitz et al. (2012); Pinkas and Reinman (2010); Williams and Sion (2008)]. Initially the
user exports a large amount of data to store at the server, and wishes to hide from the server
both the content of data and the pattern of his/her accesses to the data. The content of data
can be secured with encryption techniques. But new algorithms are needed to protect user’s
access pattern.
Here we assume that data is stored and accessed in the unit of blocks to simplify the
problem. This assumption is practical because file systems usually store data in blocks. We
use a unique block id to identify each block. The typical size of a block ranges from 32 KB to
256 KB [Stefanov et al. (2011)]. Let N denote the total number of data blocks user outsourced
to the server.
Each request from the user can be one of the following types:
• read a data block D of unique ID i from the storage, denoted as a 3-tuple (read, i,D); or
• write a data block D of unique ID i to the storage, denoted as a 3-tuple (write, i,D).
From the server side, a user’s access pattern can be one of the following types:
• retrieve (read) a data block D from a location l at the remote storage, denoted as a
3-tuple (read, l,D); or
8• upload (write) a data block D to a location l at the remote storage, denoted as a 3-tuple
(write, l,D).
3.2 Threat Model
In the threat model we make three assumptions. First the user is trusted. Operations
made by the user before transmitting are considered to be secure. Second network connection
between the user and the server, such as data transmission, is assumed to be secure. Techniques
such as SSL [Freier et al. (2011)] can effectively achieve this. Third the server is assumed to
behave honestly according to the user’s request but to be curious. The server may try to figure
out the user’s access pattern. And our goal is to prevent this happen.
Intuitively, an ORAM system is considered secure if the server learns nothing about the
user’s data access pattern. The definition of the security of S-ORAM is inherited from the
standard security definition of ORAMs [Goldreich and Ostrovsky (1996); Stefanov et al. (2013,
2011)]. It is defined as follows [Jingsheng Zhang (2014)]:
Definition Let ~x = 〈 (op1, i1, D1), (op2, i2, D2), · · · 〉 denote a private sequence of the user’s
intended data requests, where each op is either a read or write operation. Let A(~x) = 〈
(op′1, l1, D′1), (op′2, l2, D′2), · · · 〉 denote the sequence of the user’s accesses to the remote storage
(observed by the server), in order to accomplish the user’s intended data requests. An ORAM
system is said to be secure if (i) for any two equal-length private sequences ~x and ~y of the
intended data requests, their corresponding observable access sequences A(~x) and A(~y) are
computationally indistinguishable; and (ii) the probability that the ORAM system fails to
operate is negligibly small, i.e., O(N− logN ).
9CHAPTER 4. SYSTEM DESIGN
4.1 Overview
The main contribution of S-ORAM is that it makes better use of the large block size to
improve the efficiency. This is because a large-scale storage system usually stores data in blocks
and such a block typically has a large size. But most existing ORAM constructions treat data
blocks as atomic units for query and shuﬄing, and do not factor block size into their designs,
which may increase communication and storage overhead unnecessarily.
Based on the observation, S-ORAM does not treat data blocks as atomic units. Instead, it
introduces the concept of piece and segment to make better use of large-size blocks.
Piece is the unit of data shuﬄing in S-ORAM while most existing ORAM use block as
shuﬄing unit. A block is divided into pieces. The size of a piece is much smaller than a block.
With the same size of user-side storage, shuﬄing data in pieces is much more efficient than
shuﬄing in blocks.
Segment is introduced to improve query efficiency. In S-ORAM, the server-side storage is
organized in hierarchy with single-segment and multi-segment layers. Each segment contains
of an encrypted index block and several encrypted data blocks. The index block maintains the
mapping between data block IDs and their locations within the segment. Thus, for each query
in a segment, only the index block and the intended block need to be accessed. Multi-segments
layers are introduced because one single index block may not be able to store all the mapping
in that layer.
10
4.2 Storage Organization
4.2.1 Data Block Format
In S-ORAM, data are stored in data blocks, which is the unit for user to query. The
difference between S-ORAM and other existing ORAMs is that, each block is divided into
pieces, as shown in Figure 4.1. The size of each piece is z = logN bits long, where N is the
total number of user outsourced data blocks. The first piece of a data block contains the ID of
it and the remaining pieces store the actual data content.
Figure 4.1 Plian-text Block Structure
4.2.2 Data Block Encryption
lain-text data blocks need to be encrypted before exporting to server. In S-ORAM data
blocks are encrypted piece by piece with a secret key k, as shown in Equation 4.1 and in
Figure 4.2 [Jingsheng Zhang (2014)]:
ci,0 = Ek(ri), where ri is a random number;
ci,1 = Ek(ri ⊕ di,1);
ci,2 = Ek(ci,1 ⊕ di,2);
· · · ,
ci,P−1 = Ek(ci,P−2 ⊕ di,P−1).
(4.1)
The encrypted data block (hereafter called data block for brevity) is one more piece larger
than plain-text data block. The details of encryption method is described in Section 5.5.
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Figure 4.2 Data Block Format in S-ORAM [Jingsheng Zhang (2014)]
4.2.3 User-side Storage
In S-ORAM user-side storage is of constant size. Particularly, it consists of two parts:
permanent storage and cache (temporary storage). Permanent storage is used to store user’s
secret information, including three parts:
• Query Counter. It keeps track of the number of queries that the user makes. And it
triggers data shuﬄing to achieve obliviousness.
• Secret Key. It is used for data block encryption and decryption. The secret key remains
the same during the whole procedure.
• Hash Function. The user keeps a hash function for each T2-layers. It can map a data
block to one of the segments in the layer.
Cache is used for buffering and processing queried data, including encryption, decryption,
shuﬄing and oblivious sorting. In S-ORAM the size of it is fixed to 2 data block size. Compared
to cache, the size of permanent storage is much smaller. So when compute user-side storage,
permanent storage can be negligible.
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4.2.4 Server-side Storage
Data blocks are stored in a hierarchy structure in server as shown in Figure 4.3. The layers
are divided into three groups as follows.
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Figure 4.3 Server-side Storage Organization [Jingsheng Zhang (2014)]
(1)Layer 1. The top layer is called layer 1, which can contain at most 4 data blocks. For
each query all blocks in this layer will be downloaded to user-side storage. And after each query
they will be uploaded back to server along with one more data block.
(2)T1 Layers: Single-Segment Layers. Layers from layer 2 to layer L1 = b2 log logNc belong
to T1. L1 is set to b2 log logNc is to let the layers in T2 starts with 2 segments. For each layer
in T1, it consists of an encrypted index block Il and 2
l+1 data blocks. The index block is of
the same size of a data block, and has 2l+1 entries. Each entry corresponds to a data block in
the segment with three fields: Data ID, Location and Access Bit. Data ID and Location forms
a mapping relation from data blocks to its location in that segment. Access Bit is set to be 1
if that position has been accessed before. Otherwise it’s 0. At most half of the data blocks are
real data blocks as formatted in Figure 4.2, while the rest are dummy blocks each with ID 0
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and random content, as illustrated in Figure 4.4.
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Figure 4.4 T1-layer Structure [Jingsheng Zhang (2014)]
(3)T2 Layers: Multi-Segment Layers. Layers from layer L1 + 1 to the bottom layer L2 =
logN belong to T2. Segments are introduced in T2-layers. Specifically each layer in T2 consists
of Wl = d 2llog2N e segments, each of which is of the same structure as T1-layer, except that each
segment consists of 3 log2N data blocks.
The reason that each segment in T2-layer includes 3 log2N data blocks is to make sure
that, an index with a block size can contain all the blocks information in a segment (regardless
whether at a T1-layer or T2-layer). In above storage structure, the index block of a segment
has at most 3 log2N entries. As each entry contains three fields: ID of the data block (needing
logN bits), location of the data block in the segment (needing log(3 log2N) bits), and access bit,
an index block needs at most 3 log2N [logN + log(3 log2N) + 1] bits. In the existing studies of
practical ORAM schemes, N ≤ 236 is considered large enough to accommodate most practical
applications [Stefanov et al. (2011)]. As the size of an index block is less than 32 KB, it can fit
into a typical data block.
4.2.5 Storage Initialization
Before any query or shuﬄe request sent to the server, storage on both server and client
should be initialized. The user initializes the S-ORAM system as follows.
(1) Randomly pick a secret key k in user-side storage.
(2) Generate a one-way hash function HL2(·) for the bottom layer.
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(3) Encrypt N plain-text data blocks into blocks Di where i = 1, · · · , N with the secret key
k in the format illustrated by Figure 4.2.
(4) 2N dummy blocks are randomly generated and encrypted in the same way.
(5) Apply L2 shuﬄing algorithm 4.4.2 to these 3N data blocks. Upload them to layer L2
of the server storage.
(6) Upload a dummy block D to the server and let the server know it is a dummy block.
4.3 Data Query
The data query algorithm is as described in Algorithm 1. When the user queries a data
block, two blocks are accessed subsequently for each layer, index block and a data block.
More specifically, if the user want to query a data block Dt of ID t, it consists of four phases.
In Phase I, all blocks in layer 1 are retrieved and decrypted, trying to find Dt.
In Phase II, layers in T1 are accessed. Each non-empty layer is accessed top down. For each
layer, the index block is first retrieved and decrypted. If Dt can be found in the index block,
record the location of Dt, set the corresponding access bit to 1 in index block, re-encrypt and
upload it back to server. Retrieve Dt as the user knows its position. If Dt is not found in that
layer, randomly pick a dummy block Dt′ whose access bit is 0, set its access bit to 1 upload
the index block back to server. Retrieve Dt′ and discard it. Each time when a data block is
retrieved, the server will use a dummy block to fill in that position.
In Phase III, layers in T2 are accessed. Each non-empty layer is accessed top down as
follows. If Dt has not been found before layer l, segment s = Hl(t) of layer l is picked to access.
Treat that segment as a layer in T1. Then the procedure is the same as Phase II. If Dt has
already been found at a layer prior to layer l, a segment is randomly selected from layer l. Then
treat this segment as a layer in T1 and follow the procedure in Phase II.
In Phase IV, the user need to re-encrypt and upload blocks queried from layer 1 back, along
with another a data block. If the target block is not found in layer 1, the data block is the
target data block. Otherwise the data block is a dummy block.
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4.4 Oblivious Shuﬄing
Data shuﬄing is used to perturb data block locations to prevent server learning which block
before shuﬄing corresponds to which block after shuﬄing. It may happen at all layers of the
storage hierarchy except layer 1. Data shuﬄing at layer l (l = 2, · · · , L2 − 1) is triggered when
total number of queries is an odd multiple of 2l. At this moment, layer l is empty and all layers
before layer l are full. During data shuﬄing at layer l, all data blocks in layers before layer
l are re-distributed randomly to layer l. Dummy blocks may be introduced to make layer l
full. When the total number of queries is any multiple of N , data shuﬄing will happen at the
bottom layer L2. It will re-distribute data blocks in the entire storage to fill the bottom layer
and clear layers above.
4.4.1 Shuﬄing a T1-layer l
Each T1-layer contains an index block and a certain number of data blocks, similar to a
segment. In S-ORAM shuﬄing at a T1-layer will call segment-shuﬄing algorithm. Segment-
shuﬄing algorithm is shown in Algorithm 2. Here the user-side cache contains three buffers
named B0, B1, and B2. Each of them may temporarily store up to 2m
2 data pieces. m is a
system parameter with the value of 2 in my case.
The segment-shuﬄing algorithm includes two phases. In Phase I the first two pieces of all
n blocks are shuﬄed. First pieces can be decrypted using the secret key. And they can be
further used to decrypt second pieces. After that, IDs of the blocks are obtained and permuted
according to a newly picked permutation function, and then re-encrypted using the key and
newly-picked random numbers. After that, the encrypted new random numbers and encrypted
shuﬄed block IDs are uploaded.
In Phase II, the remaining pieces of all n blocks are shuﬄed. They are retrieved and
decrypted level by level. Then shuﬄe them according to the new permutation function picked
in Phase I, re-encrypt them, and upload them back to the server. For example, we can have
(p − 1)th old order pieces and (p − 1)th new order pieces at some time. In order to get pth
new order pieces, first retrieve pth old order pieces, and decrypt them with (p− 1)th old order
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pieces. Then permute them with the permutation, and re-encrypt them with (p − 1)th new
order pieces. Thus we can get pth new order pieces.
When a T1-layer l (2 ≤ l ≤ L1) need to be shuﬄed, before calling segment-shuﬄing
algorithm, the server need to make 4 copies of dummy block in order to make that layer full.
4.4.2 Shuﬄing a T2-layer l
Before shuﬄing a T2-layer l, the user need to update the hash function used for it and let
the server make 4 · 2l − w copies of the dummy blocks (w is the number of blocks above layer
l). Thus there are 4 · 2l data blocks in total to be shuﬄed. This is to ensure that the following
5 rounds of shuﬄing can be done successfully.
(1)Round I: Scanning. In this round the user retrieve all the blocks in layer l, and label
each block with two tags. For each real data block of ID i, use Hl(i) as its first-tag and 0 as
its second-tag. All dummy blocks have ∞ as their second-tag. For each first tag value j from
1 to d 2l
log2N
e, label exactly 3 log2N dummy blocks with j as their first-tag. And label the rest
dummy blocks with ∞ as their first-tag.
(2)Round II: Oblivious Sorting.
Based on the tag-tuple labeled in Round I, sort all the blocks obliviously in the non-
descending order using the oblivious data sorting algorithm presented in Section 4.5. The
sorting will first compare first-tag. If two blocks are with the same first-tag, it will compare
the second tag. After this round, for each first-tag real data blocks are before dummy blocks.
(3)Round III: Scanning. In this round the sorted sequence of blocks is scanned and divided
into segments each containing 3 log2N blocks. For each first-tag j, count 3 log2N blocks. And
after that, change the first-tag of the rest blocks with first-tag j to ∞. Thus there will be
exactly 3 log2N data blocks for each first-tag.
(4)Round IV: Oblivious Sorting. In this round it sorts all the blocks again using oblivious
sorting. As a result, all the blocks with∞ as the first-tag will move to the end of the sequence.
Then, the redundant blocks are removed.
(5)Round V: Scanning. The first four rounds can ensure that the blocks in layer l are
distributed correctly. The last round is to rebuild an index block for each segment in layer l.
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Note that even though the bottom layer L2 belongs to T2-layers, there are two main
differences between layer L2 shuﬄing and T2-layer shuﬄing. One difference is that when
layer L2 needs to be shuﬄed, the entire storage shall be shuﬄed and all blocks from every
layer shall participate in data shuﬄing. Hence, the total number of blocks to be shuﬄed is
w′ = 4 + 22+1 + · · · + 2L1+1 + 3 · 2L1+1 + · · · + 3 · 2L2−1 + 3 · 2L2 < 6N . Second difference is
that, in the five rounds, Round I scanning and Round II oblivious sorting are performed on
w′ < 6N blocks instead of 4 · 2l blocks in T2-layer shuﬄing. After Round II oblivious sorting,
only the first 4N blocks participate in Rounds III, IV, and V. The rest of shuﬄing at layer L2
are identical to the ones in T2-layer shuﬄing.
4.5 Oblivious Sort
In S-ORAM, an m-way oblivious sorting scheme based on the m-way sorting algorithm
in [Lee and Batcher (1995)] is applied. It sorts data in pieces rather than blocks, which
exploits the user cache space more efficiently and thus achieves a better performance than the
existing algorithms, particularly when the block size is relatively large (which is common in
practice [Stefanov et al. (2011)]).
As shown in Algorithm 3, to sort a set D of n blocks, the m-way oblivious sorting algorithm
works recursively as follows: if n ≤ 2m2, a segment-sorting algorithm similar to the segment-
shuﬄing algorithm is applied to sort the n blocks at the communication cost of O(n) blocks;
otherwise, the n blocks are split into m subsets each of nm blocks, the m-way oblivious sorting
algorithm is applied to sort each of the subsets, and finally a merging algorithm is used to merge
the sorted subsets into a sorted set of n blocks.
In Algorithm 3, two subroutines are called, which are the segment-sorting algorithm (Algo-
rithm 4) and the merging algorithm (Algorithm 5). The segment-sorting algorithm is based on
the segment-shuﬄing algorithm (Algorithm 2) with the difference that in segment-sorting algo-
rithm pieces are permuted based on their tags value, while segment-shuﬄing algorithm pieces
are randomly permuted. The merging algorithm first divides blocks into m groups recursively
until the blocks number of each group is less than 2m2, which means it can call Algorithm 3
to sort this group of blocks at one time. After all groups are sorted, merge them together.
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Algorithm 1 Query data block Dt of ID t [Jingsheng Zhang (2014)].
1: found← false
2: Retrieve & decrypt blocks in layer 1
3: if Dt is found in layer 1 then found← true
4: for each non-empty layer l ∈ {2, · · · , L1} do
5: Retrieve & decrypt Il – index block of the layer
6: if (found = false ∧ t ∈ Il) then
7: Set the access bit of Dt to 1 in Il
8: Re-encrypt & upload Il
9: Retrieve & decrypt Dt
10: found← true
11: else
12: Randomly pick a dummy Dt′ with access bit 0
13: Set the access bit of Dt′ to 1 in Il
14: Re-encrypt & upload Il
15: Retrieve & discard Dt′
16: end if
17: end for
18: for each non-empty layer l ∈ {L1 + 1, · · · , L2} do
19: if (found = false) then
20: s← Hl(t)
21: else
22: s is randomly picked from {0, · · · ,Wl − 1}
23: end if
24: Retrieve & decrypt Isl – index block of segment s
25: if (found = false ∧ t ∈ Isl ) then
26: Set the access bit of Dt to 1 in I
s
l
27: Re-encrypt & upload Isl
28: Retrieve & decrypt Dt
29: found← true
30: else
31: Randomly find a dummy Dt′ with access bit 0
32: Set the access bit of Dt′ to 1 in I
s
l
33: Re-encrypt & upload Isl
34: Retrieve & discard Dt′
35: end if
36: end for
37: if (Dt is found in layer 1) then
38: Encrypt an extra dummy D in local storage
39: else
40: Re-encrypt Dt in local storage
41: end if
42: Upload all blocks in local storage back to layer 1
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Algorithm 2 Segment-shuﬄing of Blocks (Di1 , · · · , Din) [Jingsheng Zhang (2014)].
/* Phase I: shuﬄing first two pieces of all blocks */
1: Retrieve (ci1,0, · · · , cin,0) to B0
2: Decrypt B0 to (ri1,0, · · · , rin,0) using k
3: Retrieve (ci1,1, · · · , cin,1) to B1
4: Decrypt B1 to (i1, · · · , in) using k and B0
5: Store (i1, · · · , in) in B2
6: Pick & store a random permutation in pi
7: Permute B2 to (i
′
1, · · · , i′n) according to pi
8: Generate, re-encrypt & upload entries of a new index block based on B2 and pi
9: for each i′j in B2 do
10: Randomly picks r′i′j
11: Encrypt r′i′j to c
′
i′j ,0
using k, and upload it
12: Encrypt i′j to c
′
i′j ,1
using k and c′i′j ,0
13: end for
14: Upload B2 to designated locations
/* Phase II: shuﬄing remaining pieces of all blocks */
15: for each v ∈ {2, · · · , P − 1} do
16: Retrieve (ci1,v, · · · , cin,v) to B0
17: for each j ∈ {1, · · · , n} do
18: Decrypt cij ,v to dij ,v using k and cij ,v−1 in B1
19: Replace cij ,v−1 in B1 by cij ,v from B0
20: Replace cij ,v by dij ,v in B0
21: end for
22: Permute B0 to (di′1,v, · · · , di′n,v) according to pi
23: Encrypt (di′1,v, · · · , di′n,v) in B0 using k and B2
24: Replace B2 by B0
25: Upload B2 to designated locations
26: end for
Algorithm 3 M-way Oblivious Sorting (D: a set of data blocks) [Jingsheng Zhang (2014)]
1: if (|D| ≤ 2m2) then
2: Apply Algorithm 4 to sort D
3: else
4: Split D into m equal-size subsets of blocks D0, · · · ,Dm−1
5: for each i (0 ≤ i ≤ m− 1) do
6: Apply Algorithm 3 to sort Di
7: end for
8: Apply Algorithm 5 to merge D0, · · · ,Dm−1
9: end if
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Algorithm 4 Segment-sorting of Blocks (Di1 , · · · , Din) [Jingsheng Zhang (2014)].
1-5: the same as in Algorithm 2
6: Construct a permutation function that sorts B2 in the non-decreasing order
7: the same as in Algorithm 2
8: blank
9-14: the same as in Algorithm 2
15: for each v ∈ {2, · · · , P} do
16-26: the same as in Algorithm 2
Algorithm 5 Merging Sorted-subsets of Blocks (D0, · · · ,Dm−1) [Jingsheng Zhang (2014)]
/* Regroup blocks */
1: s = |D0|
2: for each i (0 ≤ i ≤ m− 1) do
3: for each j (0 ≤ j ≤ m− 1) do
4: Add Di[j],Di[m+ j] · · · ,Di[s−m+ j] to D′j
5: end for
6: end for
/* Recursively merge regrouped blocks */
7: for each j (0 ≤ j ≤ m− 1) do
8: if |D′j | ≤ 2m2 then
9: Apply Algorithm 4 to sort D′j
10: else
11: Apply Algorithm 5 to merge sort D′j
12: end if
13: end for
/* Merge sorted blocks */
14: for each i (0 ≤ i ≤ sm − 2) do
15: for each j (0 ≤ j ≤ m− 1) do
16: Add D′j [im],D′j [im+ 1], · · · ,D′j [im+ 2m− 1] to D′′i
17: end for
18: end for
19: for each i (0 ≤ i ≤ sm − 1) do
20: Apply Algorithm 4 to sort D′′i
21: end for
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CHAPTER 5. IMPLEMENTATION
5.1 FUSE
5.1.1 Introduction
Filesystem in Userspace (FUSE) is an operating system mechanism for Unix-like computer
operating systems that lets non-privileged users create their own file systems without editing
kernel code. This is achieved by running file system code in user space while the FUSE module
provides only a “bridge” to the actual kernel interfaces. Users just write code that implements
file operations like open(), read(), and write(). When the file system is mounted, programs
are able to access the data using the standard file operation system calls, which call the afore
mentioned code developed by the user.
Released under the terms of the GNU General Public License and the GNU Lesser General
Public License, FUSE is free software. This implementation of FUSE is available for Linux,
FreeBSD, NetBSD, OpenSolaris, Minix 3, Android and OS X.
FUSE is built upon VFS, same level with Ext2, Ext3 and other real file systems. FUSE
is more like a converter. So compared with these traditional file systems, it has two major
advantages:
1) Convenience. Traditional file systems are defined on OS kernel level. So in order to
apply a new file system, the OS kernel needs to be modified, which is very inefficient. But
programming with FUSE is much easier and faster, which significantly reduces workload for
writing a new file system.
2) Flexibility. There are very limited libraries and a lot of limitations available when
developing for traditional file systems in kernel space. But as FUSE runs in user space level, it
can call user level libraries, which are abundant. It can even use HTTPS and FTP protocols
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to create remote file systems.
5.1.2 Preliminary: Linux File System
As FUSE provides a library for developers to build new file systems for Linux, it’s necessary
to have a basic knowledge about Linux file system. A file system is an organization of data
and metadata on a storage device. A standard interface is needed because there are many
types of file systems and media. The Linux file system interface is implemented as a layered
architecture, separating the user interface layer from the file system implementation and the
drivers that manipulate the storage devices [Jones (2007)]. For example, let’s consider the read
function call, which allows some number of bytes to be read from a given file descriptor. The
function does not need to know file system types, or what particular storage medium upon
which the file system is mounted. Yet, when the read function is called for an opened file,
the data is returned as expected. FUSE provides an interface for developers to override file
functions such as read() and write().
FUSE works in user space level in the file system architecture. The architecture in Figure
5.1 shows the relationships between the major file system related components in both user space
and the kernel. User space contains the applications (FUSE in our implementation) and the
GNU C Library (glibc), which provide the user interface for the file system calls. The system call
interface acts as a switch, delivering system calls from user space to the appropriate endpoints
in kernel space. The Virtual File System (VFS) is the primary interface to the underlying file
systems. This component exports a set of interfaces and then abstracts them to the individual
file systems, which may behave very differently from one to another. Each individual file system
implementation, such as Ext2, JFS, and so on, exports a common set of functions that is used
by the VFS. The buffer cache buffers requests between the file systems and the block devices
that they manipulate. For example, read and write requests to the underlying device drivers
migrate through the buffer cache. This allows the requests to be cached there for faster access,
rather than going back out to the physical device. The buffer cache can be managed as a set
of least recently used (LRU) lists [Jones (2007)].
There are a common set of objects that implement file system in user space, which consists of
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Figure 5.1 Architecture of the Linux Filesystem [Jones (2007)]
superblock, inode, dentry, and file [Jones (2007)]. At the root of each file system is the superblock,
which describes and maintains state for the file system. Every object that is managed within
a file system (file or directory) is represented in Linux as an inode. The inode contains all the
metadata to manage objects in the file system, including the operations that are possible on
it. Another set of structures, called dentries, is used to translate between names and inodes,
for which a directory cache exists to keep the most-recently used around. The dentries also
maintain relationships between directories and files for traversing file systems. Finally, a VFS
file represents an open file (keeps states for the open file such as the write offset, and so on).
Among these objects, inode is most widely used in our implementation. The inode represents
an object in the file system with a unique identifier. The individual file systems provide methods
for translating a filename into a unique inode identifier and then to an inode reference. A portion
of the inode structure is shown below along with a couple of the related structures. Each of
these structures refers to the individual operations that may be performed on the inode. For
example, inode operations define those operations that operate directly on the inode.
struct inode {
unsigned long i i n o ;
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o f f t i s i z e ;
struct inode ∗ i n ex t , ∗ i p r e v ;
struct i n o d e o p e r a t i o n s ∗ i o p ;
. . .
}
5.1.3 Principle of Operation
FUSE includes three modules: user space library, kernel module and mount tools. User
space library provides developers with programming interfaces. There are two sets of interfaces,
struct fuse lowlevel ops and struct fuse operations. Developers write their own file system by
registering their own functions to these structures. In our implementation struct fuse operations
is used. A portion of its structure is shown below. Kernel module (fuse.ko) provides file system
framework to support developers’ functions, defined in user space. Mount tools are used to
mount FUSE file system.
struct f u s e o p e r a t i o n s my oper = {
. g e t a t t r = my getattr ,
. open = my open ,
. read = my read ,
. des t roy = my destroy ,
. . .
} ;
The working process of FUSE is as shown in Figure 5.2. In this figure, example/hello is
an executable program linked to FUSE library. /tmp/fuse is mounted directory that will run
this file system. The FUSE kernel module and the FUSE library communicate via a special
file descriptor which is obtained by opening /dev/fuse. This file can be opened multiple times,
and the obtained file descriptor is passed to the mount syscall, to match up the descriptor
with the mounted filesystem. When example/hello is executed, a user space file system, which
is implemented in example/hello, will be mounted to current system with the mount point
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is /tmp/fuse. When user runs ls -l /tmp/fuse, corresponding VFS functions are called, then
delivered to FUSE kernel module. And kernel module will call example/hello functions based
on a mapping.
Figure 5.2 Working Process of FUSE [Szeredi (2001)]
5.2 Overview of Our Implementation
In our system model, which is described in Chapter 3, there are user side and server side.
As shown in Figure 5.3, there are three parts in our system model: Client, FUSE Server and
Storage Server. Among them, Client and FUSE Server are running locally and are trusted,
while Storage Server which stores user’s data is not trusted. Our goal is to prevent storage
server from learning user’s access pattern, meanwhile the user can operate normally.
FUSE is already introduced in Section 5.1. The rest of this chapter will cover my implemen-
tation with FUSE interfaces, basic data structures used in the system, storage initialization,
encryption method, query and shuﬄing detailed implementation, communication protocol and
storage-side buffer.
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Figure 5.3 System Model
5.3 Interface with FUSE
Based on the description above,the implementation is to write customized file operation
functions and register them with FUSE library. This way users can operate on files “locally”
in appearance, but actually it is communicating with server using S-ORAM method in the
background. The major customized functions are shown as blow. Among all the interfaces
provided by FUSE, some of them may not be necessary but they would better be implemented
because otherwise once a function is called but it’s not defined, the file system will go wrong.
Each function returns 0 on success, and returns negative value otherwise. The details of each
major function:
struct f u s e o p e r a t i o n s my oper = {
. i n i t = my init ,
. g e t a t t r = my getattr ,
. r e add i r = my readdir ,
. read = my read ,
. wr i t e = my write ,
. des t roy = my destroy ,
. . .
} ;
(1) my init():
void ∗my in i t ( struct f u s e c o n n i n f o ∗conn ) { . . . }
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This function initializes file system, and is called before other file operation functions. In my
implementation it will connect to the server and establish a socket connection. Throughout
the lifetime of the file system, it will only use this socket connection with the server.
Also, a log file name is passed to it so that when it is mounted, a log file is created to
log activities. It’s done by a data structure struct fuse context. It has a field named void*
private data, a pointer to arbitrary data stored by the file system. So we can pass some data
to the file system before it is mounted, such as parameters user enters when running it. FUSE
allows developers store and access data that they defined their own by this way.
(2) my getattr():
int my getattr ( const char ∗path , struct s t a t ∗ s t a t bu f ) { . . . }
This function is to get status of a file or a directory. It passes in a file or directory’s path and
need to fill in its status to statbuf. FUSE does not provide interface to operate on inode directly,
instead it allow developers to change file status by providing struct stat, which is defined in
Linux. Below is its structure.
struct s t a t {
dev t s t dev ; /∗ ID of d e v i c e c o n t a i n i n g f i l e ∗/
i n o t s t i n o ; /∗ inode number ∗/
n l i n k t s t n l i n k ; /∗ number o f hard l i n k s ∗/
o f f t s t s i z e ; /∗ t o t a l s i z e , in b y t e s ∗/
. . .
}
In our model when the user tries to read or write some file, the file actually does not exist
in user’s local storage. So when this function is called, we cannot call system call lstat(), which
can fill in the statbuf if the file locates locally. Instead, we need to fill in it manually. As each
block size is fixed and total block number is fixed, we can do it manually corresponding to
different path. If it equals to “\”, which is root folder path, fill in total block number. If it
equals to a block id, fill in a block size. Other fields in struct stat remain default.
(3) my readdir():
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int my readdir ( const char ∗path , void ∗buf , f u s e f i l l d i r t f i l l e r ,
o f f t o f f s e t , struct f u s e f i l e i n f o ∗ f i ) { . . . }
Similar to my getattr(), given a directory path, we need to fill in buf with files information in
this directory using fuse fill dir t filler. Once user initialize storage at server, block ids and
block numbers are known to the user. So we can also fill in the information manually. As a
result, when user goes to FUSE mounted directory and run ls, all block ids are shown to the
user. This process does not need to communicate with server because once server storage is
initialized, in our system model block can neither be added deleted. struct fuse file info keeps
information of this directory, no need to change it in this case.
(4) my read():
int my read ( const char ∗path , char ∗buf , s i z e t s i z e ,
o f f t o f f s e t , struct f u s e f i l e i n f o ∗ f i ) { . . . }
Every time a user want to read the content of a file, such as use cat command, FUSE will call
my read() function. In this procedure client will need to call query() function, described in 4.3,
which communicate with the server and follows query algorithms in S-ORAM. After the target
block is retrieved to user storage, open it locally and fill the content to buf.
(5) my write():
int my write ( const char ∗path , const char ∗buf , s i z e t s i z e ,
o f f t o f f s e t , struct f u s e f i l e i n f o ∗ f i ) { . . . }
The procedure of my write() is quite similar to my read(). It also calls query() function. The
difference is that it overrides target block with changed one locally. So at the end of query()
when client need to upload local blocks back, new block is uploaded instead of the old one.
(6) my destroy():
void my destroy ( void ∗ userdata ) { . . . }
This function is called when FUSE file system is unmounted. It will close socket connection
with server and FUSE will stop working.
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5.4 Data Structure
There are five major data structures in my implementation. They are designed to fit the
whole system and are used everywhere.
(1) PIECE:
typede f s t r u c t {
char data [ 8 ] ;
}PIECE ;
A block consists of pieces. In theory the size of a piece smaller, the better. But it must be large
enough to store a block id and fit encryption method. Because in our implementation DES is
chosen as the encryption method, which requires data of at least 64 bits, we set a piece size as
64 bits.
(2) FIRST PIECE:
typedef struct {
int b l o c k i d ;
char tag1 [ 3 ] ;
char tag2 ;
}FIRST PIECE ;
The first piece of a data block stores meta data of this block while other pieces store real data.
It consists of block id and two tags. In GCC the size of int is 4 bytes. So an int variable can
represent up to 232 blocks, which is enough for our system. tag 1 will store segment number.
Given N < 232, segments number in a layer is up to 222. So three bytes, which can represent
up to 224 segments, is large enough. tag 2 is an supplement for tag 1 in shuﬄing. In theory
one bit is enough for tag 2 but for encryption and decryption convenience, we pad tag 2 to 1
byte to make FIRST PIECE the same size as other pieces.
(3)BLOCK:
typede f s t r u c t {
FIRST PIECE f i r s t p i e c e ;
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PIECE∗ p i e c e s ;
}BLOCK;
Each block is a file stored on the server. When a user calls query(), it should be returned with
a block of this structure. Encrypted block does not have first piece filed and has one more piece
than clear block.
(4)ENTRY:
typede f s t r u c t {
i n t b l o c k i d ;
char pos [ 3 ] ;
char a c c e s s ;
}ENTRY;
One ENTRY is one mapping relation from block id to position, along with access filed to
indicate whether this position has been visited or not. One bit is enough for access, but for
encryption and decryption convenience, it’s padded to 1 byte. Thus one entry will be 8 bytes,
same as a piece size.
(5)INDEX BLOCK:
typede f s t r u c t {
ENTRY e n t r i e s [ BLOCK SIZE/PIECE SIZE−1] ;
}INDEX BLOCK;
An index block is of the same size of a clear data block. It consists of entries. After encryption
its structure is the same as encrypted data block.
5.5 Encryption
In S-ORAM data blocks are encrypted piece by piece with a secret key k, which is mentioned
in Section 4.2.2. The encryption method Ek is Data Encryption Standard (DES). We use DES
as our encryption method as it can encrypt as low as 8 bytes data at one time, which is exactly
a piece size.
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The mode of operation we use is Cipher-block chaining (CBC). In CBC mode, each piece of
plain text is XORed with the previous cipher text block before being encrypted. This way, each
cipher text piece depends on all plain text pieces processed up to that point. To make each
block unique, an random vector must be used in the first block. Because in S-ORAM shuﬄing
is on pieces, this mode ensures that the client can sort blocks based on their tag values. Once
the client get the first piece of blocks in a segment, it can decrypt the rest pieces in that segment
level by level.
The DES algorithm implementation is based on OpenSSL library [Project (1998)]. It imple-
ments the basic cryptographic functions and provides various utility functions. DES encryption
and decryption can be done with three functions:
• void DES set odd parity( DES cblock *Key )
This function is to set the parity of the passed key to odd. The key is given by the user
and must be 8 bytes long.
• int DES set key checked( DES cblock *Key, DES key schedule *schedule )
It will check that the key passed is of odd parity and is not a week or semi-weak key. If
the parity is wrong, then -1 is returned. If the key is a weak key, then -2 is returned. If
an error is returned, the key schedule is not generated. The key schedule is an expanded
form of the key, used to speed the encryption process.
• void DES cfb64 encrypt( const unsigned char *in, unsigned char *out, long length,
DES key schedule *schedule, DES cblock *key, int *num, int enc )
Encryption and decryption happens in this function. It encrypts or decrypts a single 8
bytes DES cblock in CFB mode. As we only need to encrypt and decrypt data of 8 bytes,
the mode actually does not matter as long as it operates on 64 bits.
This function transforms the input data, pointed to by input, into the output data,
pointed to by the output argument. If the encrypt argument is non-zero, the input is
encrypted in to the output using the key schedule specified by the schedule argument, pre-
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viously set via DES set key. If encrypt is zero (DES DECRYPT), the input is decrypted
into the output.
5.6 Query
As mentioned in Section 5.3, query() function is the bridge between our FUSE Server and S-
ORAM design. It is also the only interface provided by S-ORAM implementation. Developers
only need to call this function and do not need to consider all the operations happening behind
it, including encryption, decryption, shuﬄing and communication, which makes the system
very convenient to use.
The input of query() is block id. It will be passed to Algorithm 1. In the implementation
of the algorithm there are three key functions.
(1)INDEX BLOCK getIndexBlock(int layer, int segment number, bool* empty)
When query a block, the user will retrieve an index block from each layer top down. This
function is called to retrieve the index block given its segment number and layer number. If
such index block does not exist in the server-side storage, it indicates that that layer is empty.
The function will set the boolean variable empty to true. Otherwise get the encrypted index
block from the server, decrypt and return it.
(2)ENTRY queryInThisLayer(INDEX BLOCK index block, int block id, bool found)
After get the index block of a segment, the user needs to check whether the target block
id can be found in that layer, if it has not been found yet. If yes, return its entry. Otherwise,
return an entry recording the information of a dummy block whose access bit is 0.
(3)void queryBlock(ENTRY entryToQuery, int layer, int segment, INDEX BLOCK* in-
dex block) Based on the entry returned by queryInThisLayer, this function will retrieve a data
block at the position on that layer. Then set the access bit of that position to 1 in the index
block. Re-encrypt it and upload it.
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5.7 Shuﬄing
The shuﬄing part basically follows algorithms described in Section 4.4 but in order to fit
our system model, some details need to be specific.
(1)Query Counter. The system maintains a global integer variable query counter from
the beginning to the end on the client side. Each time the client calls function query(),
query counter will increase by 1. It’s used to trigger shuﬄing and update hash function. The
way it triggers shuﬄing is explained in Section 5.7. Each T2-layer has a hash function and
when it is shuﬄed the hash function is updated with current query counter [See Section 5.7].
So the client need to maintain the value of query counter for each T2-layer. Each time shuﬄing
a T2-layer, the client need to store current value of query counter for that layer.
(2)Trigger of Shuﬄing. Each time when all layers before layer l is full, shuﬄing at layer
l should happen. This can be done by examining query counter. Based on the observation of
server-side storage organization, for any layer except layer 1, say layer l, it need to be shuﬄed
when the lth bit of query counter is 1 and all the bits before it are 0. The code is shown below.
int needShu f f l e ( int query counter ){
int i = 0 , x = query counter ;
while ( ( x != 0) && ( ( x&1) != 1)){
i ++;
x = x>>1;}
i f ( i >1) return i ;
return 0 ;
}
(3) Segment Shuﬄing. As is described in Section 4.4.1, it is used in T1-layer shuﬄing and
segment shuﬄing in T2-layer. In our model communication with server is involved. The flow
chart is shown in Figure 5.4.
During the process the server maintains an array of block pointers. Before shuﬄing, the
server create an array and store pointers of blocks to be shuﬄed in it. At first all pointers point
at the very beginning of each block. After then because pieces in a block is access sequentially,
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Figure 5.4 Flowchart of Segment Shuﬄing
we don’t need to control the pointers manually. When they point to the end of blocks, the
shuﬄing is also done.
(4)Hash Funtion Based on the design of S-ORAM, the value of the hash function in our
system need to be different if one of the three variables has changed: block id, layer number
and query counter. So these three variables are stored sequentially in a contiguous memory
space and then calculate its MD5 result as its hash value.
The MD5 algorithm operates on a 128-bit state, divided into four 32-bit words. These are
initialized to certain fixed constants. It then uses each 512-bit message block in turn to modify
the state. The processing of a message block consists of four similar stages, termed rounds; each
round is composed of 16 similar operations based on a non-linear function, modular addition,
and left rotation.
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5.8 Communication
The communication between client and server is based on TCP socket. A socket is an end
point of communication between two systems on a network. To be more precise, a socket is
a combination of IP address and port on one system. So on each system a socket exists for a
process interacting with the socket on other system over the network.
The system calls for establishing a connection are different for the client and the server, but
both involve the basic construct of a socket. A socket is one end of an interprocess communi-
cation channel. The two processes each establish their own socket.
The steps involved in establishing a socket on the client side are as follows:
• Create a socket with the socket() system call. The call to the function socket() creates
an UN-named socket inside the kernel and returns an integer known as socket descriptor.
• Connect the socket to the address of the server using the connect() system call. Informa-
tion like IP address of the remote host and its port is bundled up in a structure and a
call to function connect() is made which tries to connect this socket with the socket (IP
address and port) of the remote host.
• Send and receive data. Once the sockets are connected, the server sends the data on
client’s socket through client’s socket descriptor and client can read it through normal
read call on the its socket descriptor.
The steps involved in establishing a socket on the server side are as follows:
• Create a socket with the socket() system call.
• Bind the socket to an address using the bind() system call. This call assigns the details
specified in the structure serv addr to the socket created in the step above. The details
include, the family/domain (for Internet family of IPv4 addresses we use AF INET), the
interface to listen on(in case the system has multiple interfaces to network) and the port
on which the server will wait for the client requests to come.
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• Listen for connections with the listen() system call. After the call to listen(), this socket
becomes a fully functional listening socket.
• Accept a connection with the accept() system call. In the call to accept(), the server is
put to sleep and when for an incoming client request, the three way TCP handshake is
complete, the function accept() wakes up and returns the socket descriptor representing
the client socket.
• Send and receive data.
In our system once a socket connection is established between the client and the server, it
will be used for future communication until the client close it. Two categories of functions are
defined in this part:
(1) GET
The client call functions in this category to get data from the server. Usually one round is
enough. The client send a GET request along with a few parameters then wait at the socket.
The server receives the request and send corresponding data to client. The client will count
received data size. Once received data size reaches expected value it stops receiving. After
finishing sending data, the server will return to waiting for request on the socket.
(2) POST
This category consists of functions for client to post data to server. There are usually two
rounds in such a process. In first round The client send a POST request along with a few
parameters then wait at the socket. Once the server receives it sends READY back to the
client and wait for data. In the second round the client sends data to server. After server
finished receiving, it returns to wait for a new request.
5.9 Server-side Buffer
In server-side storage, data are stored in blocks. But segment shuﬄing is triggered, we need
to get and set the ith pieces of a set of blocks. So a buffer mechanism is needed to operate on
a certain level of pieces of a set of blocks. In my implementation, each time before segment
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shuﬄing, the server will open all the blocks in that segment and store the file pointers in an
array. Then the following two functions will be called to operate on the pieces.
char∗ getPieceArray ( int s i z e ){
PIECE∗ r e s = mal loc (PIECE SIZE∗ s i z e ) ;
int i ;
for ( i =0; i<s i z e ; i ++){
f r ead (& r e s [ i ] , PIECE SIZE , 1 , F i l e P o i n t e r s [ i ] ) ; }
return (char∗) r e s ;}
void se tPieceArray (PIECE∗ content , int s i z e ){
int i = 0 ;
for ( i =0; i<s i z e ; i ++){
f s e e k ( F i l e P o i n t e r s [ i ] , −s izeof (PIECE) , SEEK CUR) ;
f w r i t e (&content [ i ] , s izeof (PIECE) , 1 , F i l e P o i n t e r s [ i ] ) ;
}
}
getPieceArray() will read a piece-size data from each of the file pointers to form the pieces
array buffer. After processing the pieces array, setPieceArray is called to set the pieces array
back to blocks. Note that during this process piece level does not need to be given as we always
do this level by level. And file pointers will move automatically when we read or write from it.
We only need to move them a piece size back when we write it. This makes processing pieces
array more convenient.
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CHAPTER 6. EVALUATION
6.1 Settings
The evaluation is done in a MacBook Air laptop. Two virtual machines are created by
Virtual Box with the same configuration. One plays the client and the other plays the server.
The specific configurations of the MacBook Air and virtual machines are shown in Table 6.1.
In Host-only Mode, two virtual machines can be set in the same internal network so that they
can communicate with each other.
Configuration MacBook Air Virtual Machine
Operationg System OS X 10.9.2 Ubuntu 12.04 LTS
CPU 1.8 GHz Intel i5 with 2 processors 1.8 GHz Intel i5 with 1 processor
Storage Spcace 128 GB 20 GB
Memory 4 GB DDR3 1 GB DDR3
Network - Host-only Mode
FUSE Version - 2.9.2
Table 6.1 Experiment Environment
6.2 Security
To prove that our implementation can successfully protect the user’s access pattern, we
observe blocks access frequency from the server side. In the first experiment the client keeps
querying the same block. In the second experiment, the client queries blocks randomly. If
the access pattern of the two experiments are the same or very similar, the security of our
implementation can be demonstrated. Here, we set the total number of real data blocks to
N = 256 and querying times T = 100, T = 500 and T = 1000, respectively.
The results show that if we observe the frequency of each layer, there is no difference at all.
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The access patterns are exactly the same as shown in Table 6.2 and Table 6.3. So we choose
layer 3, layer 5 and layer 7 to see if we can tell any difference on certain layers. The results
when querying 1000 times are shown in Figure 6.1, Figure 6.2 and Figure 6.3. We can see that
the positions on a certain layer are access randomly. No access pattern is leaked.
Layer 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8
Frequency when T = 100 150 48 48 48 36 36 0 100
Frequency when T = 500 750 248 248 244 244 244 244 500
Frequency when T = 1000 1500 500 496 496 488 488 488 1000
Table 6.2 Block Access Frequency when Keep Querying Same Block
Layer 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8
Frequency when T = 100 150 48 48 48 36 36 0 100
Frequency when T = 500 750 248 248 244 244 244 244 500
Frequency when T = 1000 1500 500 496 496 488 488 488 1000
Table 6.3 Block Access Frequency when Keep Querying Random Block
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Figure 6.1 Access Pattern in Layer 3 Querying Same and Random Block
6.3 Overhead
The overhead includes user-side storage, communication overhead for query and communi-
cation overhead for shuﬄing. As the permanent user-side storage is much smaller than cache,
we only count cache as user-side storage. Because for every N queries the average communica-
tion overhead would be the same, we only record overhead when querying N times for different
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Figure 6.3 Access Pattern in Layer 7 Querying Same and Random Block
N .
The communication overhead results are shown in Table 6.4 and Table 6.5. The results show
that the measured communication overhead of my implementation is consistent with theoretical
results, in both query and shuﬄing.
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N
Max User-side Storage
(# of blocks)
Average Overhead
Measured (# of blocks)
Average Overhead
In Theory (# of blocks)
64 2 8
O(log(N))256 2 10
1024 2 12
4096 2 14
Table 6.4 Query Overhead Measured and Theoretical Results
N Total Shuﬄing Times
Average Overhead Measured
(# of blocks)
Average Overhead in Theory
(# of blocks)
64 16 13
O(log2(N))256 64 44
1024 256 81
4096 1024 147
Table 6.5 Shuﬄing Overhead Measured and Theoretical Results
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CHAPTER 7. CONCLUSION
Cloud storage has a wide range of applications and is becoming more and more popular.
This thesis implements a Segmentation-based Oblivious RAM (S-ORAM) to efficiently protect
users’ data security and privacy in cloud storage .
Data encryption alone is often not enough to protect the user’s privacy in outsourced storage
as access pattern can leak sensitive information as well. A typical approach to prevent this
from happening is using Oblivious RAM, which allows a client to conceal its access pattern by
continuously shuﬄing and re-encrypting data as they are accessed. However, many existing
ORAM constructions consume too much storage and communication bandwidth, which makes
them not practical.
In this thesis, we implement a new approach named S-ORAM. Two segment-based tech-
niques, piece-wise shuﬄing and segment-based query, are used to efficiently improve the effi-
ciency in query and data shuﬄing.
Evaluation have been conducted to test the security and the performance of my implemen-
tation. The results show that my implementation of S-ORAM can fully protect clients’ access
pattern. It only requires constant user-side storage and the communication overhead is on the
same complexity level as the theoretical result.
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